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Salvador Dolly (Dolly) has a rare and valuable genetic trait.'
Something in his genome makes him immune to the HIV virus. This
is, of course, good news not just for Dolly, but also for medical re-
searchers around the world. If they could only map his genome and
find the specific genes that confer immunity, they might be able to
develop genetic therapies that would counter the deadly AIDS conta-
gion. Indeed, this is well underway. A cutting-edge biotechnology
firm, NuGenEra, Inc., has sequenced Dolly's genome and has iso-
lated regions of his DNA that confer HIV resistance. Naturally, Nu-
GenEra patented its discoveries before announcing them and making
them available to genetic scientists. To be more precise, NuGenEra
patented Dolly's genome and ten of his genes. When Dolly started
marketing his own genome, NuGenEra sued him for patent
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, and Co-Director, Program for
Law & Technology. I wish to thank my colleagues Lawrence Solum and Ed-
ward McCaffery for their tireless work on the conference, my research assis-
tant, Andrea Lin, for helping me with this Introduction, Samuel Tiu, for writ-
ing the mock patent, and James Warren, for his assistance with Judge Patel's
Memorandum and Order. Additional thanks go to Jennifer Kefer, law clerk to
Chief Judge Patel, and Susan Vaughan, judicial extem to Chief Judge Patel,
both of whom were indispensable in turning this academic exercise into a real-
istic and fascinating case.
1. NuGenEra v. Dolly, (W.D. Cal. 1999) (No. MHP019999) is a hypo-
thetical case. The Court Order, Points and Authorities, and Reply Briefs im-
mediately follow this Introduction.
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infringement. As one might imagine, the NuGenEra v. Dolly case
has attracted considerable attention in the press and scientific and le-
gal communities.
The NuGenEra case is only slightly preposterous. It is undoubt-
edly fictional, but not all that far-fetched. The case was the focal
point for this year's At the Crossroads Conference, sponsored by the
Program for Law and Technology (Program) at California Institute
of Technology (Caltech) and Loyola Law School (Loyola). As with
previous mock cases, the Program constructed NuGenEra v. Dolly to
explore emerging issues at the intersection of law and technology.
The Program has recently completed its third year as a joint ef-
fort by Caltech and Loyola. Conceived by a joint alumnus, Henry C.
Yuen,2 President and Chief Executive Officer of Gemstar-TV Guide
International, the Program promotes dialog among students, faculty,
and industry leaders in the realms of law, science, and technology. It
is premised on the belief that law and technology are in an intensely
interactive stage of development, where each profoundly influences
the other. Academics and practitioners in these disciplines must
learn each other's languages in order to negotiate the growing com-
plexity of modem society.
In its first two years, the Program focused on the legal problems
of cyberspace, clearly an area where technology is forcing a reex-
amination of legal precepts, and vice versa. In one mock case,
Closed Corp. v. Open Sesame,3 an Internet users' group, consisting
of anonymous volunteers who collaborated online, was sued for in-
fringing Closed Corporation's patented computer operating system.
After a hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Honorable
Diarmuid O'Scannlain 4 ruled that the case could go forward against
the Internet users' group, using e-mail for service of process.' That
ruling was affirmed on appeal by the Honorable Richard A. Posner,
6
2. Ph.D., California Institute of Technology, 1974; J.D., Loyola Law
School, 1979.
3. David J. Steele & Karl Manheim, Closed Corp. v. Open Sesame: A
Simulated Infringement Case Arising in Cyberspace, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1055, 1057 (2000).
4. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting by designation).
5. See Hon. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Reporter's Transcript of Bench
Ruling: First Annual At the Crossroads of Law & Technology Conference, 33
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1157, 1164 (2000).
6. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (sitting by designation).
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who held that the Internet users' group was a suable entity with the
Internet as its principal place of business.
7
This year's mock case--NuGenEra v. Dolly--was no less chal-
lenging. Now that the human genome has been mapped 8 and nearly
all human genes have been sequenced, there is a gold rush to patent
these "inventions." 9 While still controversial among the public, gene
patents have become both routine and accepted in the legal and bio-
tech communities. Even entire organisms, such as bacteria ° and
mice," have been patented. A full human genome, however, has yet
to be patented. The prospect raises profound questions of law and
morality.
It also raises serious practical questions, as NuGenEra v. Dolly
demonstrates. Nothing in patent law limits the grant of a patent to a
party whose "property" served as the basis for the invention. Nu-
GenEra claims to have legitimately acquired tissue samples from
Dolly, and invested considerable time and financial resources in iso-
lating the genetic material. The finished product-isolated and puri-
fied DNA sequences-may have been derived from Dolly's tissue,
but it is not that tissue. It is something different. Indeed, it is not a
tangible product at all, but pure information-the stuff of intellectual
property.
Dolly, of course, has a different view of the whole episode. Not
only does the patent violate his privacy and personal autonomy, it is
a misuse of the property right he enjoys in his own body. Moreover,
7. See Hon. Richard A. Posner, Court Opinion: Second Annual At the
Crossroads of Law & Technology Conference, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1345,
1351 (2001).
8. See Human Genome Project Information, Sequencing: DNA Sequencing
and Sequence Variation, at http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/research/sequencing.
html (last modified Nov. 7,2001).
9. Every human gene has been patented or is the subject of a pending ap-
plication. See Douglas Steinberg, Will Genomics Spoil Gene Ownership?,
THE SCIENTIST, http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2000/sep/steinberg_p1_
000904.html (Sept. 4, 2000).
10. A patent on a new strain of Pseudomonas bacteria was upheld in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty. See 447 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1980). The case is credited
with ushering in a new era of biotechnology patents.
11. In April 1988, inventors from Harvard Medical School obtained the
first patent for a higher-order animal called a "transgenic mammal"--a mouse
carrying human cancer genes-commonly referred to as the "Harvard mouse"
or "Oncomouse." See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988), avail-
able at http://patft.uspto.gov.
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public policy should preclude the patenting of a human genome, es-
pecially without consent. It may be a brave new world out there
when it comes to genetic science, but the law still protects fundamen-
tal individual rights. Or does it?
Advancements in science and technology often challenge our le-
gal regimes and traditional understanding of rights. As the Informa-
tion Revolution speeds forth with the aim of benefiting society's
general health, growth, and economic prosperity, it also ushers in an
era of legal uncertainty. So too exotic advances in biotechnology,
among other rapidly expanding scientific frontiers, raise difficult
questions in intellectual property and personal rights. These ques-
tions have spawned new concerns in bioethics, which have yet to be
fully discussed in legal, political, and social arenas. It is only
through open, interdisciplinary discourse among the affected com-
munities that society will be ready to answer the hard questions, such
as who owns Dolly's genome?
This was the question that the packed courtroom at Caltech's
Ramo Auditorium wanted answered. The parties in NuGenEra v.
Dolly called renowned genetic experts, Dr. Noriyuki Kasahara 12 and
Dr. Richard Myers, 13 to help the Honorable Marilyn Hall Pate114 re-
solve the difficult question. I will not presage her answer, but in-
stead invite you to read the Court's Order, as well as the briefs filed
in support of cross-motions for summary judgment, that follow this
Introduction.
In addition to the testimony and argument presented at the hear-
ing,15 this year's At the Crossroads Conference featured academic
panels on Genetic Property, Genetic Privacy, and Genetic Progress.
12. Assistant Professor of Pathology, Biochemistry & Molecular Biology,
at the Institute for Genetic Medicine of University of Southern Califor-
nia/Norris Comprehensive Cancer Center.
13. Professor of Genetics at Stanford University and Director of the Stan-
ford Human Genome Center.
14. Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of
California (sitting by designation).
15. Plaintiff, NuGenEra, Inc. was represented by Loyola students Olga Kay
and Andrea Lin, and Caltech students, Katharine Ip and Paul Updike. Advis-
ing the students were Robert Berliner and Margaret Churchill, of Fulbright,
Jaworski and Walker, LLP, Los Angeles. The Defendant, Dolly, was repre-
sented by Joe Andrieu and Elizabeth Hong of Caltech, Lir Burke and Mimi
Chiang of Loyola, and advisors Catherine Polizzi of Morrison and Foerster,
LLP, Palo Alto, and Michael Wise, Lyon & Lyon, LLP, Los Angeles.
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Noted scientists, including Caltech President David Baltimore,
16
joined legal academics to debate difficult issues attendant to recent
genetic advances-among them, cloning and stem cell research. A
full description of this year's Conference, including biographical in-
formation on panelists and participants, can be found on the Program
website. 17 While agreement was reached on some of the issues, the
dispute between NuGenEra and Salvador Dolly is unresolved. Per-
haps the following materials will assist you in reaching your own
conclusion.
II. OVERVIEW OF NuGenEra v. Dolly
This year's mock trial posed several fundamental questions con-
cerning the boundaries of property, privacy, and patentability, which
arose from breakthroughs in medicine and biotechnology. The case
begins with Salvador Dolly, an ordinary individual who sought a ge-
netic test prior to fathering a child. Upon conclusion of the testing,
and through a routine acquisition of discarded tissue samples, a
medical research company, NuGenEra, stumbled upon an invaluable
discovery-that a particular gene sequence within the man's DNA
increased resistance to HIV. Realizing its enormous potential for
both a hefty contribution to science and commercial profitability,
NuGenEra decided to invest time and effort toward isolating the se-
quences, and eventually obtained a patent on its invention. The pat-
ent was comprised of three claims, including one that encompasses
Dolly's entire genomic sequence, one that identifies the particular
gene combination that confers the demonstrable increase in resis-
tance, and an immortalized in vitro cell line derived from the isolated
gene combination.
NuGenEra, thinking it was performing a public service, cheer-
fully notified Dolly of his special genetic makeup. This immediately
caused him to wonder where he fit in the big picture of such a scien-
tific achievement. Understanding the commercial appeal of this
newfound characteristic, he decided to market its research appeal and
sold two blood samples to university scientists. After it learned of
the sales, NuGenEra sued Dolly for patent infringement. In his mo-
tion for summary judgment, Dolly made several affirmative de-
16. David Baltimore is a Nobel Laureate in genetic engineering.
17. See http://techlaw.lls.edu.
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fenses, which challenged conceptions of property, privacy, and the
general validity of a patent that claims the sequence of a human ge-
nome.
The first affirmative defense was that Dolly retained a property
interest in his excised tissue. It is true, from a legal and intuitive
standpoint, that an individual has the right to protect and control
one's bodily autonomy prior to removal of tissue. However, once
one has voluntarily surrendered a blood sample, how much control
may that person exert over the ultimate disposition of this tissue?
Under the landmark case of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,18 a patient does not have a continuing right to control the
disposition of excised cells under traditional property principles.
19
The Defendant in this case, however, stressed a constitutional prop-
erty right that attached not only to the physical material, but also to
the information stored within his DNA. In essence, he claimed a
property right to his genome.
This property right, though currently unsupported in case law,
may be more easily understood by examining another constitutional
right that it affects: privacy. Privacy is now consistently upheld in
principle by the Court through the right to marry,20 the right to refuse
medical treatment,2 1 and the right to procreate.22 By similar logic,
can we also extend our privacy right to bar the use of a tissue sample
18. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
19. See id. at 142-44, 793 P.2d at 493-94, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
20. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that
the state's interest in ensuring compliance of a court ordered child support
agreement is insufficient to restrict the right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating that denial of the fundamental freedom of marriage
on the basis of race is "subversive of the principal of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941)
(defining marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man").
21. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (holding that a state may choose to defer only to a patient's wishes
rather than entrust the decision to close family members); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (holding that a per-
son's right to privacy encompasses a virtually absolute right to refuse medical
treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (stating that a guardian of
an incompetent child can seek termination of life support).
22. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (stating that
sterilization of habitual criminals invidiously discriminates by exacting un-
equal punishments upon those who have committed intrinsically the same type
of offense).
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solely because it contains our DNA? What kind of consequences
would this have on the pace and economics of biomedical research?
This question of control over excised tissue also implicates the
idea of informed consent. It is well established in the law that in-
formed consent is necessary prior to the taking of bodily tissue,23 but
what is not so clear is how to ensure that the patient receives and
fully understands the scope of this consent.24 Indeed, Moore rein-
forced the requirement of informed consent but never specified what
the appropriate remedy should be in the event of inadequate consent.
How should we construct our informed consent forms, and, as in this
case where the tissue sample was ultimately purchased for biomedi-
cal research, how far down the line of scientific utility should the
duty extend? As concluded by the Conference panel on Genetic
Property, informed consent is an area which must be further clarified,
and it must take into account particular factors such as the compre-
hension level of various cultures both overseas and in the United
States.
The focus of the mock trial, however, resulted in spotlighting
and reevaluating our current system of granting patents. Because
patents embody a government grant of ownership of information, it
is necessary to carefully define what inventions may be patented.
The Supreme Court has always construed patent laws broadly,25 in
concert with the idea that the nature of inventions is one of unpre-
dictability and cannot be legislatively predetermined. This leaves the
general details of patentability to be decided as a matter of public
policy. The current thinking on patenting genes, by both the Su-
preme Court and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), ap-
pears to be flexible. On the one hand, research companies require
23. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 128-29, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
24. In NuGenEra, Dr. Myers testified for Defendant that standard medical
practice required fully informed consent in this context. See National Human
Genome Research Institute, Model Consent for Use of Tissue Samples for Hu-
man Genome Project Cell Lines, at http://www.science.doe.gov/ober/humsubj/
doenchgr.html (last modified Jan. 3, 1997).
25. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 n.6 (1980) (citing the
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act as indicating that Con-
gress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that
is made by man"); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 598 (2001) (supporting the notion that Congress intended
that patent laws be given wide scope).
967April 2002]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:961
the incentive of patent protection to make the huge investment in the
infrequently successful, risky venture that is biotechnology. Yet, on
the other hand, giving these companies the right to exclude others
may either grant patent owners a license to charge excessive fees for
necessary drug products,26 or worse, give them the unilateral right to
prevent further research whatsoever on the patented matter.27 Af-
fordability problems concerning the AIDS vaccine in Africa and the
recent threat by the Canadian government to thwart the patent on the
drug Cipro illustrate the importance of worldwide access and need.28
We have long chosen a patent system of privatization, subject to
regulatory oversight that is political at its core. Given our new found
wariness of monopolistic practices, is it time to make a change in our
balance of policy considerations? Is the system still serving the pub-
lic interest, and can it do so on a global scale, or have individual
rights fallen secondary to the general good? And finally, because
some drugs are simply undiscoverable without patent protection, is it
advisable to make the decision to grant a patent on pure policy prin-
ciples or should we approach each patent application on a case-by-
case basis?
Perhaps the current practice of granting patents is simply too
broad. In the mock trial, out of the original three claims, the Defen-
dant succeeded in invalidating Claim 1, which encompassed an entire
26. The price Bayer charges for Ciprofloxacin ("Cipro") varies greatly
around the world, ranging from $1.29 (U.S. $) per 500 mg tablet in New Zea-
land, to $4.67 (U.S. $) for the same product in the United States (wholesale
price). See Selected Prices for Ciprofloxacin, at http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/cl/cipro/ciproprices.html (last modified Oct. 25, 2001). Generic
equivalents are as cheap as 3¢ (U.S. $) per tablet in some countries, such as In-
dia. See id.
27. See generally Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Bio-
pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 813 (2001) (arguing that patent law needs to preserve competition
in the biopharmaceutical industry by limiting the scope of patents). In at least
one case, this was the intended result. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking
Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 190
n.269 (2000) (discussing efforts by opponents of genetic research to obtain a
patent for a human-animal hybrid in an effort to block research into certain
human genes).
28. See Patent Act R.S.C. ch. P-4, § 19 (1985) (Can.), http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/canadal.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). Patented
Cipro costs $1.58 (U.S. $) per 500 mg tablet in Canada, while the generic ver-
sion costs 95¢ (U.S. $). See Selected Prices for Ciproflaxacin, supra note 26.
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genomic sequence. Judge Patel held that the Defendant had demon-
strated enough evidence to show a lack of utility to overcome the
presumption of validity afforded to patents. 29  This holding was
clearly case specific, as the standard of evidence regarding pat-
entability would have been lower had the patent not yet been granted.
Additionally, while the judge in this case had a remarkable grasp of
genetic science, it is possible that the plaintiffs expert testimony of
utility could have convinced a different trier of fact.
The constitutional rights of privacy asserted by the Defendant
were dismissed as a defense, as the court found that the right to sell
blood did not conform to traditional notions of privacy. The court
did, however, acknowledge a right to privacy of genetic information
but could not answer the question of whether this could provide a ba-
sis for overturning the patent. In a sense, this question embodies the
general social concern with genetic privacy. How do we weigh the
value of biomedical advancements against an individual's expecta-
tion of genetic privacy? A classic situation is that of an employee
who is reluctant to undergo genetic testing for fear of losing his job,
which places one's reputation, insurability, and health at risk. As
discussed in the panel on genetic privacy, this fear could be ade-
quately addressed with public education. Yet if we are to effectively
deal with genetic discrimination, more research is certainly needed
into the genesis of genetic disease in order to understand to what ex-
tent an individual's genes may predict his behavior.
III. THE COURT'S FINDINGS
Overall, the mock trial ruling followed case law and general
PTO rules in requiring satisfaction of each prong of patentability.
While the court acknowledged the ethical and policy issues that must
be answered, it could not offer us a decision, for many aspects of
these issues are undoubtedly yet to be realized. Indeed, in the
judge's concluding remarks, she notes that the role of the court is to
enforce laws, rather than to create them, and that this is particularly
problematic in the case at hand due to a lack of legislation regarding
genetic information and ethics as they relate to patents.
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) ("A patent shall be presumed valid");
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-59
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
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This ruling instead sets the stage for purposeful debate, similar
to the one which concluded the Conference. As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky noted while moderating the panel on Genetic Privacy,
the law must either apply longstanding principles to new technolo-
gies or agree to make a radical change in the conceptual framework
that surrounds the interplay of these two areas. While it is not certain
that society will ever come to a true consensus on how the law
should be interpreted or if it should be changed at all, the pace of
biotechnology will not stop to let us catch up. It is a "law-forcing"
phenomenon of great magnitude. We must therefore allow ourselves
ample opportunity to ensure that we are prepared to address the in-
evitable conflicts between the rapidly emerging, divergent interests
of an increasingly high-tech society and the individuals who live in
it.
